Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2005

Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug Provisions of the
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement
Kevin Outterson
Boston Univeristy School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kevin Outterson, Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug Provisions of the Australia-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, 2 Journal of Generic Medicines 316 (2005).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/669

This Article is brought to you for free and open access
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug Provisions of the AustraliaUS Free Trade Agreement
2 Journal of Generic Medicines (pending, 2005)
Kevin Outterson
is an Associate Professor of Law at West Virginia University and an appointed member
of the Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council.
Abstract
The Australia-US free trade agreement which entered into force on 1 January 2005
contains many remarkable provisions of interest to generic drug companies. Independent
Australian researchers expect that generic entry will be delayed by up to three years once
the provisions are fully implemented.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2005, the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) entered into
force. 1 (The timeline for the AUSFTA negotiations is found in Table 1.) Apparently for
the first time, 2 a free trade agreement modifies domestic pharmaceutical pricing policy, 3
moving well beyond the intellectual property provisions of the WTO TRIPS Agreement. 4
The AUSFTA also exports some provisions of the US Hatch-Waxman Act, with some
interesting domestic political implications in both the US and Australia. Generic drug
makers would do well to pay careful attention to the process of international trade
agreements. 5

1

Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (2004 (available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us.html).
2
Becker, E. & Pear, R. (2004) ‘Trade Pact May Undercut Inexpensive Drug Imports’, N.Y. Times (12 July
2004).
3
In Australia’s case, the modification is made to the government’s decision to list a drug for
reimbursement at an agreed price under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).
4
World Trade Organization, Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement (1994). The “TRIPS Plus”
provisions of AUSFTA are listed in Table 3.
5
While generic drug industry trade organizations submitted testimony in both Australia and the US, the
brand name drug industry was much more active and effective, as demonstrated by the provisions of the
AUSFTA.

Several excellent articles are available on the pharmaceutical provisions of the AUSFTA
generally; 6 this article focuses on the aspects of particular interest to the generic drug
industry.

ATTACKING FREE RIDERS THROUGH HIGHER DRUG PRICES
The most important pharmaceutical goal for the United States in the AUSFTA was to
raise Australian drug prices. 7 Since most drugs in Australia are reimbursed under the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), the AUSFTA had to modify PBS in order to
meet US objectives. Brand-name drug companies have complained for years that PBS
prices are too low; independent researchers have generally lauded the PBS as paying for
value through an economics-driven Phase IV reimbursement process. The US took the
former view in the negotiations, and sought to raise Australian drug prices so that
Australia would stop ‘free riding’ and pay its ‘fair share’ of drug R&D costs. I am
skeptical about many aspects of the free rider argument, but have written about it
elsewhere and will not belabour the point here. 8
What is the scope of Australia’s alleged free riding? The US International Trade
Administration recently calculated the amount as US$400 million per year. 9 Australian
estimates of America’s price-rise ambitions were similar, topping AU$500 million per

6

See, e.g., Harvey, K. (2004) ‘Patents, pills and politics: the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme’, Australian Health Review, Vol. 28(2), pp. 218-226
(Nov. 2004). Drahos, P. & Henry, D. (2004) ‘The free trade agreement between Australia and the United
States: Undermines Australian public health and protects US interests in pharmaceuticals,’ British Medical
Journal, Vol. 328, pp. 1271-1272 (29 May 2004). See also the submissions to the Australian Senate by the
Generic Medicines Industry Association Pty Ltd., the Doctors Reform Society, the Public Health
Association of Australia, Inc., the Australian Nursing Federation, Catholic Health Australia, the National
Center for Epidemiology and Population Health, the Australian Consumers’ Association, and Dr. Ken
Harvey, all available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/freetrade_ctte/indes.htm.
7
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (2003) ‘PhRMA “Special 301” Submission to
the Office of the United States Trade Representative: Australia’ (available at www.ustr.gov). Colebacht,
T. (2003) ‘Bush Wants End to Medicine Subsidies’, The Age (Melbourne), (24 Oct. 2003, at 5). Hearing
of the US Senate Finance Committee (2004), ‘The Administration’s International Trade Agenda’ (Witness:
Ambassador Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative). McClellan, M. B. (2003) ‘Speech before the
First International Colloquium on Generic Medicine’ (25 Sept. 2003, available at
www.fda.gov/oc/speeches/2003/genericdrug0925.html. Serafini, M.W. (2004) ‘Drug Prices: A New Tack’
National Journal, Vol. 36, p. 16 (17 April 2004) (“So [House Speaker] Hastert and [Senator] Kyl
championed the novel idea that the key to lowering U.S. prescription drug prices is to persuade foreign
governments to raise their prices…The idea of trying to level the international playing field on prescription
drug pricing originated with the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. But Hastert and Kyl played significant roles
last fall in persuading the Bush administration to embrace this strategy…The result was the United States’
first free-trade agreement that included modest concessions on pharmaceutical price controls.”) Of course,
increased prices for brand-name drugs would be good news for generic makers, permitting them to increase
their own prices whilst still undercutting the competition.
8
See Outterson, K. (2004a), ‘Free Trade Against Free Riders?’, Pharma Pricing & Reimbursement, Vol. 9,
pp. 254-55.
9
[US] International Trade Administration (2004) ‘Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD Countries:
Implications for U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, and Innovation.

year. 10 Table 2 illustrates how much the US International Trade Administration thinks
drug prices should rise in several OECD countries. The process will require further trade
agreements. 11
The primary AUSFTA mechanism for increasing PBS prices was the addition of an
appeal in the Australian government’s pharmaceutical reimbursement process.12 Under
the AUSFTA, if the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) declines to
list a drug for reimbursement at a particular price, the drug company may request an
independent review. The appeal will apparently rest in a single Department of Health
and Aging (DoHA) reviewer, who will look at the PBAC file, as well as other data which
may be submitted by the companies or the government. 13 Commentators with direct
experience with the PBAC believe this process will pressure to the PBAC to list drugs
they would not have otherwise listed, or to list drugs at higher reimbursement prices than
otherwise would have been the case. 14 Indeed, higher prices were the explicit purpose of
the provision, at least for the US negotiators.
The question of free riding places Australian and US politicians in the position of quietly
undermining each other’s announcements. In the US, USTR Zoellick was congratulated
on a job well done, 15 which means that the process will cause PBS drug prices to rise. In
Australia, Trade Minister Vaile, in the midst of the recent Australian election campaign,
insisted that prices would not rise at all. 16 Success cannot have come to both.
Independent observers expect the appeals process and other AUSFTA provisions to have
a significant upward impact on PBS drug prices. 17 Whether it reaches the magnitude of
10

The estimate was AU$ 1.5 billion over 2006-2009. Productivity Commission (2001), ‘International
Pharmaceutical Price Differences: Research Report’ (available at
http://www.pc.gov.au/study/pbsprices/finalreport/pbsprices.pdf (assumes that the top 5 PBS expenditure
drugs are delayed). For a higher estimate, see Burton, B. (2004) Brit. Med. J., Vol. 329, p. 7461 (Sept.
2004).
11
Becker, E. & Pear, R. (2004) ‘Trade Pact May Undercut Inexpensive Drug Imports’, N.Y. Times (12 July
2004) (statements of Dr. Mark B. McLellan, former head of FDA and current administrator of Medicare
and Medicaid) (statement of Joseph M. Damond, Associate Vice President of PhRMA). Maher, S. (2004),
‘US Drug Makers Pressure Canberra’, The Australian (29 Dec. 2004) (statements of US Senators Rick
Santorum and Jon Kyl).
12
AUSFTA (2004), Annex 2-C, ¶2(f).
13
Burton, B. (2004) Brit. Med. J., Vol. 329, p. 7461 (Sept. 2004).
14
See, e.g., Harvey, K., et al. (2004), ‘Will the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?’, Med. J. Austr., Vol. 181, pp. 256-259 (Sept. 6, 2004). Dr. Harvey
is a former member of the PBAC. See also Drahos, P. et al. (2004) ‘The FTA and the PBS: A submission
to the [Australian] Senate Select Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement’, p. 3.
15
Hearing of the US Senate Finance Committee (2004), ‘The Administration’s International Trade Agenda’
(Witness: Ambassador Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative) (2004).
16
Vaile, M. (2004), ‘Free Trade Agreement with the United States’, Media Release, 8 Feb. 2004
(MVT08/2004) (available at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt008_04.html). See also
Abbott, T. (2004) ‘Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), Implementation of the
Obligations to Improve Transparency of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) through An
Independent Review Mechanism, Hearings before the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
(PBAC) (25 July 2004) (statement of The Hon. Tony Abbott, MP, Minister for Health and Ageing).
17
Drahos, P. et al. (2004) ‘The FTA and the PBS: A submission to the [Australian] Senate Select
Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement’, p. 1.

US$400 million per year remains to be seen. More importantly, the AUSFTA will not
affect 90% of the alleged OECD free riding described in the US ITA Report. US
officials suggest that additional trade agreements are in the offing on this issue.
The trade agreement strategy is unlikely to be effective. To raise global prices
significantly, the US must force Canada, Australia, Japan and all of Europe to change an
important domestic policy. Is this likely to be effective? Would it be a prudent use of
American diplomatic and trade leverage?
It is far more likely that the US will ‘succeed’ in raising drug prices in smaller and more
vulnerable countries. In the face of genocidal access issues, do we really want to raise
drug prices in Central America and the Dominican Republic through CAFTA-DR? In the
Morocco or Jordan FTAs? In sub-Saharan Africa? Can anyone imagine a worse idea for
global drug pricing? 18
When it comes to the world’s poorest countries, the free rider label is especially
inapposite. Low income countries cannot contribute much global drug R&D cost
recovery, and should be considered fair followers rather than free riders. The eminent
economist F.M. Scherer described this policy in a recent article, echoing the cries of
essential medicines advocates like Médecins Sans Frontières. 19

EXPORTING HATCH-WAXMAN
The Hatch-Waxman Act 20 regulates the generic entry process, striking an oftencontroversial compromise between innovation and low-cost generic access. The current
state of Hatch-Waxman leaves much to be desired, but it probably reflects the current
political balance of power between PhRMA and those who pay for drugs, including
governments and managed care companies.
Whatever its charms for the US population, it seems unlikely that Hatch-Waxman
represents the ideal policy for countries as diverse as Israel, the Dominican Republic,
Morocco or Australia. When the US inserts Hatch-Waxman provisions into trade
agreements, the policy debate is not transparent. 21 Health experts are frequently not
18

Outterson, K. (2005) ‘Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing access and Innovation in International
Prescription Drug Markets’ Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics, Vol. 5(1), pp. 193-286.
19
‘t Hoen, E. (2002) ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way
from Seattle to Doha’ Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 3, p. 27.
20
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28 and 35 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act].
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA also influences the patent process, since Hatch-Waxman extends
the patent for half of the period that a drug is undergoing clinical trials, plus the full amount of time spent
in the FDA approval process. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155, 155A, 156 (2000).
21
See, e.g., Médecins sans Frontières (2004), MSF Briefing note, Access to Medicines at Risk Across the
Globe: What To Watch Out For in Free Trade Agreements with the United States, pp. 4-6. (available at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/ftabriefingenglish.pdf); Vivas-Eugui, D. (2003) Quaker U.N.
Office, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), pp. 16-18.

involved. Hatch-Waxman provisions may be quietly accepted in exchange for limited
US concessions regarding market access for agricultural or manufactured products.
These processes lack transparency and democratic legitimacy.
Several provisions of the AUSFTA are grafted from Hatch-Waxman. Article 17.10.4 of
the AUSFTA introduces into Australian law the new “26B Certificate.” 22 The 26B
Certificate is similar to the Hatch-Waxman provision which ties marketing approval to
patent status. Generic entry in the US has been greatly delayed by litigation under this
provision, particularly the automatic 30-month stay. The Federal Trade Commission
criticized many anticompetitive aspects of this situation, 23 which has now been
modified. 24 Trading partners should carefully review the American experience with
these provisions before importing them unawares. Generic companies with experience
with the Hatch-Waxman system could be valuable sources of advice to governments
negotiating free trade agreements with the US.
Another provision of the AUSFTA locks-in domestic law in both countries which
provides patent term extensions for the regulatory approval process. 25 This portion of
Hatch-Waxman is now carved in stone in both US and Australian law, and cannot be
modified without approval from both governments. Since the US initiated this provision
of the AUSFTA, in a sense the US has tied its own hands, preventing some future
amendments to Hatch-Waxman in the US. Upon closer examination, it was the USTR,
under the strong influence of PhRMA, and with the consent of Congress under fast track
authority, which has tied the hands of future Congresses. While the chance of Congress
repealing patent term extension for the regulatory approval process was admittedly
remote, it is now remoter still. More fundamental reforms to the drug innovation system,
such as the Hubbard-Love R&D proposal, 26 face additional barriers due to the AUSFTA.
The political effects of the AUSFTA process is discussed in more detail below.
Notably missing from the AUSFTA was the Bolar Amendment, which permits generic
companies to perform the research necessary to have a generic drug ready to market upon

22

US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Bill 2004, The Senate, The Parliament of the Commonwealth
of Australia.
23
Federal Trade Commission (2002) GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, pp. 13-23.
24
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), tit. IX (partially codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)). The
Congressional Research Service prepared a summary of the Act which provides some guidance on
Congress’s intent in amending Hatch-Waxman. See Cong. Research Service (2003) ‘Prescription Drug and
Medicare Improvement Act of 2003, Bill Summary and Status, S.1, 108th Cong.’ (June 13, 2003).
25
AUSFTA (2004), art. 17.9.8.
26
Hubbard, T. ‘Alternatives to the Price System, Presentation at Columbia University’ (Dec. 4, 2003)
(available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html). Love, J. (2003)
‘A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, Presentation at Columbia University’ (Dec. 4,
2003) (available at http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/accesstomedicines_papers.html).

patent expiration. 27 The AUSFTA also granted 5 years of market exclusivity for new
uses, beyond the US standard of 3 years. 28
Beyond the AUSFTA, recent US free trade agreements have tinkered with various HatchWaxman and related provisions, including data exclusivity delaying generic entry, the
Bolar Amendment, exhaustion rules on parallel trade, and freedom to utilize the Doha
Paragraph 6 process for compulsory licensure.29
The Labour Amendments
Australian critics charged that the AUSFTA could permit ‘evergreening,’ the Australian
term for artificially extending the effective length of patents and exclusive marketing
periods. 30 Independent researchers determined that the AUSFTA would likely delay
generic entry by an average of three years. 31 The Australian Labour party, then in the
control of the Senate, offered amendments to the AUSFTA implementing legislation to
address this concern. The amendments caused quite a stir in Washington, which
threatened to undo the AUSFTA on that basis alone. 32 In the end, the US reluctantly
allowed the amendments to stand, but reserved its rights to challenge the practice at a
later date.
The Labour amendments can best be described as a toothless tiger. The most important
amendment permits an AU$ 10 million penalty for drug patent litigation in bad faith.
This penalty will never be imposed. The amendment provides broad exceptions for
‘reasonable grounds’ for suing for infringement. 33 Any decent legal opinion will
immunize the company against the AU$ 10 million penalty. Proving bad faith will be
difficult, absent a smoking gun document from the drug company. The final provision of
the penalty requires a promise to conduct the patent litigation “without unreasonable
delay.”
27

Jaeger, K. (2004) ‘Statement of Kathleen Jaeger, Generic Pharmaceutical Association’ US House Ways
& Means Committee Hearings on the US - Australia Free Trade Agreement.
28
AUSFTA (2004), art. 17.10(1)(c); Jaeger, K. (2004) ‘Statement of Kathleen Jaeger, Generic
Pharmaceutical Association’ US House Ways & Means Committee Hearings on the US - Australia Free
Trade Agreement.
29
Letter to Robert B. Zoellick from Charles B. Rangel, Jim McDermott, Sander M. Levin & Henry A.
Waxman (15 July 2004) (US-Morocco FTA); Médecins sans Frontières (2004), MSF Briefing note, Access
to Medicines at Risk Across the Globe: What To Watch Out For in Free Trade Agreements with the United
States, pp. 4-6. (available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/ftabriefingenglish.pdf); VivasEugui, D. (2003) Quaker U.N. Office, Regional and Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), pp. 16-18.
30
For Australian concerns about evergreening, see Lokuge, B., Faunce, T. & Denniss, R. (2003) ‘A
Backdoor to Higher Medicine Prices? Intellectual Property and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement’
(Nov. 2003). See also Bulow, J. ‘The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents’, in Innovation Policy and the
Economy, Vol. 4.
31
Drahos, P. et al. (2004) ‘The FTA and the PBS: A submission to the [Australian] Senate Select
Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement’, p. 2.
32
Letter from US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick to Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile (Nov. 17,
2004).
33
US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Bill 2004, Amendment (2), The Senate, The Parliament of the
Commonwealth of Australia (codified as new section 26C of the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989).

If by some chance the penalty is ever proposed against a company, it may be challenged
under WTO rules. The US has already warned of a challenge under WTO
nondiscrimination rules. 34
The other two amendments lower the standard for the Australian generic certification of
noninfringement to “reasonable grounds,” and regulate the process for interlocutory
(declaratory) injunctions. 35 The Labour amendments failed to include many suggestions
from Australian academics, including requests for a transparent ‘Orange Book’ register in
Australia; a process for obtaining Orange Book data for other countries to facilitate
generic exports from Australia; and more rigorous review of pharmaceutical patents by
both IP Australia and the PBAC. 36 It also failed to take full advantage of the negative US
experience with declaratory judgment actions involving generic drugs.

POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE AUSFTA PROCESS
Free trade agreements permit companies to achieve indirect legal change that was
blocked through direct routes, and does so with less transparency. The AUSFTA was no
exception.
Changing domestic law
For example, in the US copyright terms were extended by an additional 20 years in 1998
to protect the nearly-expired copyrights on Mickey Mouse and other early 20th-Century
copyrighted works. This law was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2003. 37 The law
protects Mickey in Southern California, but what about Australia? Attempts to get a
similar law passed in the Australian Parliament were apparently unsuccessful, so the
proponents of longer copyrights resorted to the AUSFTA process. Carefully placed in
the 1000 page document, and receiving precious little public attention, was Australia’s
concession to extend copyright terms from 50 years to 70 years following the death of the
creator, even if the creator was already dead. Walt Disney died on Dec. 15, 1966, and the
original period would have expired in Australia on Dec. 15, 2006.
Lock-in current law
The AUSFTA also includes many provisions which allegedly don’t reflect a change in
law, such as the ‘side letter’ provision permitting company applications to the PBAC for

34

TRIPS requires patent laws to not discriminate on the basis of technological field. The US argument
would be that Australia’s amendment discriminates against the field of drug patents, since the provision
does not apply to non-drug patents. This raises the interesting question as to whether the entire US HatchWaxman apparatus violates TRIPS nondiscrimination rules.
35
US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Bill 2004, Amendments (1) and (3), The Senate, The
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (codified as new section 26B(1)(a) and 26D of the TGA).
36
Drahos, P. (2004) ‘Dealing With Evergreening’.
37
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 916 (2003).

subsequent price adjustments. 38 Another Australian example is direct to consumer
advertising (DTC). With the exception of New Zealand, PhRMA has been unable to
persuade other major markets to embrace US-style DTC. The AUSFTA includes a
provision on web-based advertising provision in paragraph 5 of Annex 2C. A domestic
example is the provision blocking US importation of cheaper drugs from Australia while
the issue was being hotly debated in Congress. 39
Australian officials insist that these provisions (and many others, found on Table 3)
merely reflect current law, 40 but their protestations ring hollow, for at least three reasons.
We will take paragraph 5 of Annex 2-C as the example, but similar arguments apply to
most of these provisions.
First, if paragraph 5 merely reflects current law, why give it a prominent place in the
AUSFTA? 41 At the very least, enshrining a rule in the AUSFTA prevents the Australian
Parliament from adopting a different rule later, absent the consent of the United States.
This ‘lock in’ effect is significant, preventing later reconsideration of the issue in the
Australian Parliament. The democratic legitimacy of using free trade agreements to lockin domestic political gains is weak, for it effectively gives a veto to the other country for
certain domestic legal changes.
A second major change is procedural. If a drug company mounts an overly aggressive
web-based DTC campaign, the AUSFTA now provides a process and a remedy outside of
Australian law. (Look at Pfizer Australia’s Viagra site 42 for a possible example). The
matter won’t be decided solely under Australian law; the USTR may get involved; it can
be discussed at the Medicines Working Group; 43 the US may apply ‘Special 301’
pressure, or request consultations under Chapter 21 of the AUSFTA. Ultimately, if
compromise proves impossible, it will be decided by a panel of trade experts.
Finally, while the Australian government seems confident today that they would win such
a case, trade lawyers may disagree. Paragraph 5 includes apparent standards for web38

AUSFTA side letter.
Becker, E. & Pear, R. (2004) ‘Trade Pact May Undercut Inexpensive Drug Imports’, N.Y. Times (12 July
2004). Shaffer, E. and Brenner, J. (2004) ‘The US-Australia Free Trade Agreement Can Preempt Drug
Reimportation Bills’ (12 July 2004) (available at www.cpath.org). The debate was primarily about imports
from Canada, yet one has to ask why the USTR insisted in blocking cheap imports from Australia when
Congress was considering permitting imports. By placing the provision in a free trade agreement, USTR
locked in the law for Australia, safe from Congressional legislation. One commentator suggest that the
AUSFTA provision actually commits the US to forego re-importation from any country. Weissman, R.
(2004) ‘Patent provisions in Australia FTA’ IP-Health list serve (7 July 2004).
40
See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on the AUSFTA Roundtable on the PBS (June 21, 2004); personal
communications with Ruth Lopert, DoHA.
41
A remarkable number of the AUSFTA pharmaceutical provisions are apparently already provided in
Australian law. The Australian FTA Implementation Bill covered only a limited range of issues raised in
the AUSFTA, namely the issues of patent scope and the new “26B Certificate” a generic company must
provide when applying for marketing approval. The scope of lock-in appears to have been great.
42
See http://www.welcomebacktiger.com.au/.
43
Indeed, the US plans to call the first meeting of the Medicines Working Group in early 2005 to complain
about Australian attempts to reduce drug prices. Maher, S. (2004), ‘US Drug Makers Pressure Canberra’,
The Australian (29 Dec. 2004).
39

based DTC, and the panel may well decide that the paragraph was intended to have some
meaning, rather than none at all. The panel hearings and deliberations need not be public,
and are not required to welcome submissions from nongovernmental organizations and
trade associations. 44
Creating new law-making processes
We can also expect the AUSFTA to continue to provide new law making processes, far
from the public eye. The AUSFTA created a “Medicines Working Group” to facilitate
further discussions on pharmaceutical issues under the Agreement. The creation of the
MWG is significant, and is likely to represent the cutting edge of the US-PhRMA agenda.
The terms of reference are unbalanced, including “the importance of pharmaceutical
research and development” but excluding universal access to medicines. 45 Much as the
generic industry was shut out of USTR’s IFAC-3 and ISAC-3 Committees, 46 it may also
lack representation or clout on the MWG. The MWG will be a political process which is
not transparent, with direct input into Australian drug policy, dominated by pro-PhRMA
constituencies.
Affecting multilateral trade negotiations
A final example of the political effects of the AUSFTA is its use to subtly undermine
multilateral agreements promoting generic production of medicines. The Doha
Declaration to the TRIPS Agreement states that “trade agreements should be interpreted
and implemented to protect public health and promote universal access to medicines.”47
The interpretative principles found in Annex 2-C of the AUSFTA focus primarily upon
the IP rights of drug companies, omitting the proper balance of affordable access to
therapy. Most notably, the interpretive principles omit the Doha language and other
TRIPS provisions protective of public health. This is the language which has been used
by advocates of essential access to speed the delivery of generic anti-retroviral drugs to
sub-Saharan Africa and other impoverished areas stricken with the AIDS crisis. The
absence of this language in the AUSFTA is a missed opportunity by the Australian
generic industry to participate in compulsory licensing for export under TRIPS. It also
bodes ill for any future Australian attempt to claim the benefit of the TRIPS public health
language to address the needs of the Australian public. Global advocates of essential
medicines access (and the generic companies which supply such medicines) should have
had a larger role in the negotiation of the AUSFTA.

44

AUSFTA (2004), Article 21.5 – 21.11.
AUSFTA (2004), Annex 2C.
46
This Committee advised USTR on pharmaceutical IP issues in the AUSFTA. The Committee includes
several representatives from PhRMA or PhRMA member companies, but no representative from generic
manufacturers or healthcare consumer interests. [USTR website] The GPhA did not testify before the
Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on AUSFTA, but submitted a written statement only. List of
Witnesses To Appear Before Committee on Ways and Means, Full Committee, On Hearing on
Implementation of the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, June 16, 2004.
47
WTO (2001) ‘Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health’, Doha WTO Ministerial,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ [ ] (Nov. 20, 2001).
45

CONCLUSION
Generic companies and their customers have much to lose in free trade agreements
negotiated around the world. Policy arguments are available to counter PhRMA’s onesided lobbying, but the industry and its customers must be more fully engaged in the
process of agenda-setting and negotiations in future free trade agreements.
* * * * *

Table 1. AUSFTA pharmaceutical provisions time line

January 2003

PhRMA lobbied the USTR, demanding that Australia “refrain
from trade distorting, abusive, or discriminatory price controls
such as the current PBS reference pricing.” 48

March 2003

First round of AUSFTA negotiations begin, including discussions
about the PBS drug pricing system.

October 2003

President Bush and Prime Minister Howard meet. President Bush
is reported to have pushed for higher PBS prices as a key goal for
the AUSFTA, suggesting that Australia was free riding on
American innovation. 49

Dec 2003

Sen. Ian Campbell, representing the Australian Health Minister,
stated in Parliament: “The Prime Minister and the Minister for
Trade have both made it very clear that the PBS is not on the
table…The US has made no proposals to Australia concerning the
PBS.” Stephen Deady, Australia’s chief negotiator later told the
Senate inquiry that PBS was discussed at the first round of
negotiations, in March 2003. 50

Feb 2004

Treaty negotiations completed in record time (11 months). Trade
Minister Vaile claims “The PBS, in particular the price and listing
arrangements that ensure Australians access to quality, affordable
medicines, remains intact.” 51
But USTR Zoellick was
congratulated by members of the US Senate Finance Committee

48

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (2003) ‘PhRMA “Special 301” Submission to
the Office of the United States Trade Representative: Australia’ (available at www.ustr.gov).
49
Colebacht, T. (2003) ‘Bush Wants End to Medicine Subsidies’, The Age (Melbourne), (24 Oct. 2003, at
5).
50
[Australia] Senate Committee Report (2004), ‘Final Report on the Free Trade Agreement between
Australia and the United States of America’, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, p. 103.
51
Vaile, M. (2004), ‘Free Trade Agreement with the United States’, Media Release, 8 Feb. 2004
(MVT08/2004) (available at http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2004/mvt008_04.html).

that the AUSFTA achieved its goal to raise Australian drug
prices. 52
18 May 2004

AUSFTA signed by US and Australia.

14-15 July 2004

Approval by US House and Senate, respectively.

3 Aug 2004

US implementing legislation signed by President Bush.

13 Aug 2004

Australian Senate approval of the Implementation Bill, with 3
Labour Amendments.

1 Jan 2005

AUSFTA enters into force.

52

Hearing of the US Senate Finance Committee (2004), ‘The Administration’s International Trade Agenda’
(Witness: Ambassador Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative).

Table 2. ITA estimated annual pharmaceutical free riding
(in millions of US$)
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Source: [US] International Trade Administration (2004), fig. 5 (standard units, 2003 data).

Table 3. Comparison of AUSFTA Pharmaceutical Provisions with TRIPS and the
(Australian) AUSFTA Implementation Bill 2004.
AUS
FTA
Annex
2-C.1

Annex
2-C.2
Annex
53

TRIPS+?
Principles (priority of R&D, ‘access’ an issue
only in the context of gaining marketing
approval, market distribution of
pharmaceuticals unless appropriate value
paid by government)
Transparency
Medicines Working Group

FTA
Bill 53

Yes
Arts.7, 8, 30

Yes
Art. 63
Yes

This column lists the provisions of the FTA Bill which implement the AUSFTA. As can be seen, most
of the provisions of the AUSFTA are not covered by the FTA Bill. In a few instances, citations to existing
law are given (ie., [Australian] Therapeutic Goods Act of 1989, §25A(2)), but references to existing
Australian law have not been made systematically.

UK

2-C.3
Annex
2-C.5
17.1.9

Internet marketing permitted

Yes

Grandfathers all existing IPRs under the
AUSFTA
Patent scope: ordre public and morality, etc.

No
Art.70
17.9.2
No
Art.27
17.9.2
Patent scope: plant and animal patents
Yes
Art.27.3(b)
17.9.3
Limits the exceptions to patents
No
Art.30
17.9.4
Adopts the domestic exhaustion rule, Yes
preventing parallel imports of patented goods. Art. 6
This provision allows companies to price
discriminate on a State basis.
17.9.5
Revocations only on basis which would have Yes
justified refusal to grant, or fraud, Art.32
misrepresentation or inequitable conduct
17.9.6
Allows a Party to permit generic drug Yes
companies to use patented products solely to
prepare for marketing approval
17.9.7
Addresses
compulsory
licensure
and Yes
bypassing patents for anti-competitive Art.31
reasons
17.9.8(a) Party must lengthen patent term if patent Yes
approval was delayed more than 4 years after Art.33
application, or 2 years after a request for
examination, or was otherwise delayed
unreasonably.
Unclear whether the
‘compensation’ must be a day-for-day
extension.
17.9.8(b) Party must lengthen pharmaceutical patent Yes
term to compensate for unreasonable
curtailment of the effective patent term for the
marketing approval process
17.9.11
Disclosure:
eliminates the TRIPS Yes
requirement that the ‘best mode’ be disclosed Art.29.1
17.10.1(a) Use of safety and efficacy data by generic Yes
applicants: 5 year exclusivity
Art.39.3
17.10.1(c) Use of third State’s marketing approval:
5 year exclusivity
17.10.2
Data on ‘similar’ products: 3 year exclusivity
17.10.3

Yes
Art. 39.3
Yes
Art.39.3
Exclusive marketing rights can extend beyond Yes
the expiration of the 20-year patent
Art. 33

Sch.8
Sch.8
Sch.8

Sch.8

Existing
TGA
§25A(2)

17.10.4

Measures to block generic marketing if a Yes
patent is claimed

Sch.7New
§26B of
TGA

